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Structured Sentencing and the Puzzling Statutory Maximum
Punishment: Apprendi's Impact on North Carolina Sentencing
Law
For centuries criminal law generally has required the government
to prove each element of a crime to a jury' "beyond a reasonable
doubt."2 For more than thirty years the Supreme Court has
interpreted the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
require the states to provide an accused the option of a jury trial in
circumstances where one would be required in a federal prosecution3
and to adhere to the reasonable doubt standard The Supreme Court
expanded these protections in Apprendi v. New Jersey,5 holding that
any fact other than recidivism must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt to a jury if it increases the maximum punishment for an
offense.6 Thus, the protections of the jury trial and reasonable doubt
standard are no longer limited to the substantive elements of a crime;
they now extend to facts that increase the maximum punishment.7
In State v. Lucas,. the North Carolina Supreme Court confronted
the "maximum penalty" prong of the Apprendi rule. This task raised
an interpretive difficulty because, as discussed below, the Structured

1. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.
3; U.S. CONST. amend. VI; N.C. CONST. of
1776, Declaration of Rights, § 9; cf.MAGNA CHARTA ch. 29 (1225) ("Nor will we not pass
upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful Judgment of his Peers. ..."). See generally
THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (supporting the jury trial clause of U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.
3); ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280-87
(Alfred A. Knopf ed., 1945) (1835) (describing the jury trial as a "mitigation of the tyranny
of the majority").
2. See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 341, at 428-32 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed.
1992); 9 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2497, at 404-19 (Chadboum rev. 1981). Courts rarely
instruct juries on the meaning of reasonable doubt. See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 14
(1994); 9 WIGMORE, supra, § 2497, at 405-09. For North Carolina's definition of
"reasonable doubt," see State v. Bryant, 337 N.C. 298, 302, 446 S.E.2d 71, 73 (1994)
(defining "reasonable doubt" as, among other things, "an honest and substantialmisgiving
generated by the insufficiency which fails to convince your judgment and confidence and
satisfy your reasons as to the guilt of the defendant").
3. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (holding "that the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which-were they tried in
a federal court-could come within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee").
4. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,364 (1970).
5. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
6. Id.at 490.
7. See id,
8. 353 N.C. 568,548 S.E.2d 712 (2001).

1034

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

Sentencing Act9 creates an ambiguity in the maximum penalty for
most felonies. The court clarified the ambiguity in the statute, 10 yet
applied the Apprendi rule in a manner inconsistent with cases from
other states and all of the federal courts of appeals."
2
This Recent Development summarizes Apprendi1
and briefly
describes the procedures for sentencing a defendant under the
Structured Sentencing Act.13 It then analyzes Lucas and the
14
decision's implications for structured sentencing in North Carolina.
These implications include:
the calculation of the maximum
punishment for an offense, whether aggravating factors can survive an
Apprendi attack, Lucas's divergence from other Apprendi case law,
the new requirement that sentencing enhancements be pled in
indictments, and whether certain sentencing enhancements must be
modified procedurally.
An understanding of Lucas's implications requires a brief
analysis of the facts, holding, and reasoning of Apprendi. The
controversy in Apprendi arose after the petitioner was arrested and
indicted on several weapons-related offenses for firing shots into an
African-American family's home. 5 Apprendi pled guilty to two
counts of a second-degree offense, which carried a five to ten year
sentence, 6 and one count of a third-degree offense, which carried a
three to five year sentence.' 7 On the count relating to the shooting,
the judge imposed a sentence of twelve years 8 pursuant to New
Jersey's hate crime law.19 This law authorized the judge to increase
the maximum sentence up to ten years on a second-degree offense if
he finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
"acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual ... because of race,

9. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1340.10 to 15A-1340.23 (1999); see infra notes 42-73 and
accompanying text.
10. See Lucas, 353 N.C. at 596, 548 S.E.2d at 731 (holding that "the Statutory
Maximum Sentence" is that which a defendant with the highest prior record level for the
offense class would receive after a finding of aggravating circumstances and a decision to
apply the highest possible minimum sentence).
11. See infra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
12. See infranotes 15-37and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 38-68 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 69-135 and accompanying text.
15. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,469 (2000).
16. Id at 469-70 (citing NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a)(2) (West 1995)).
17. Id. at 470 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a)(3)). Only one count of the seconddegree offense related to the shooting. IL
18. Id. at 471.
19. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 2000). The shorter sentences on
the other counts ran concurrently. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 470.
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color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity" in
committing the crime2

The Court held this statute unconstitutional.

21
Although the Court provided several formulations of the ruling,
its primary holding stated that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and

proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi's "watershed change
in constitutional law"' is derived from the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment and the right to a jury trial afforded by the
Sixth Amendment

4

New Jersey's sentencing scheme violated the

Constitution because it allowed the judge to find facts that increased
the sentence beyond the maximum penalty by a mere preponderance
of the evidence?5
The Court established constitutional justifications for the burden

of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the jury trial guarantee in
criminal prosecutions in its prior cases. 2 6 The novelty of Apprendi is
its expansion of these protections to facts that merely increase a

20. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C44-3(e) (West Supp. 2000). The fact that the statute was a
"hate crime" enhancement did not affect the Court's decision. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at
475.
The Court previously held that hate crime sentencing enhancements are
constitutional when the jury finds the existence of racial animus beyond a reasonable
doubt. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 480-90 (1993).
21. Apprendi, 530 U.S at 532-33 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The formulations that the
Court gave for impermissible sentencing procedures included: "a legislative scheme that
removes the jury from the determination of a fact that, if found, exposes the criminal
defendant to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished according to
the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone." Id at 482-83.
22. Id at 490.
23. Id at 524 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
24. Id at 476. The Due Process Clause encompasses the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard, see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970), and incorporates the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial in criminal cases. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
149 (1968).
25. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 491. The "preponderance of evidence" burden of proof
requires the prosecuting party to prove that a fact is more likely than not in that party's
favor. See 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 339, at 421-24; 9 WIGMORE, supra note 2,
§ 2498, at 419-33.
26. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509-10 (1995); In re Winship, 397 U.S.
at 364; Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149. The Apprendi Court gave further historical rationales for
these protections. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 (noting that the purpose of trial by jury is
"to guard against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers," and "as the
great bulwark of [our] civil and political liberties" (quoting J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION

OF THE UNITED STATES 540-41 (4th ed. 1873))); 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *343 (1796) (stating that

"[t]he truth of every accusation.., should afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous
suffrage of twelve of [the defendant's] equals and neighbours") (second alteration in
original).
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defendant's maximum sentenceY In light of historic common law
practices in England and the United States, the Court rationalized the
extension of these constitutional safeguards to the sentencing
context.s Generally, common law judges had little discretion in
sentencing, and sentencing factors were nonexistent.2 9 The Court's
foundation for requiring procedural safeguards as a matter of
constitutional law was that exposure to punishment beyond the
maximum term results in a heightened deprivation of liberty and,
consequently, an increased stigma attaches to the crime.30 In these
circumstances, constitutional safeguards are no less important at the
time of sentencing than they are during trial31 because a fact that gives
a defendant a sentence beyond the maximum sentence for the crime
is essentially an element of a greater offense.32
Apprendi does not abolish the use of sentencing factors in all
circumstances. Rather, as long as the sentence imposed is "within the
range prescribed by statute," the judge is free to take into account any

factors that relate to the crime and the criminal, provided the findings
are based on a preponderance of the evidence. 3
In addition,
recidivism remains a factor properly within the judge's discretion,
whether or not established beyond a reasonable doubt.' Apprendi
27. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 524-25 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
28. See id. at 476-87.
29. Id. at 479. As Blackstone stated, "'the court must pronounce that judgment,
which the law hath annexed to the crime.'" Id (quoting 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at
*369-70). Imprisonment was little known to the common law. The sentence for all
felonies in England until the early part of the eighteenth century was death, and
misdemeanants were often punished by hard labor or placement in a pillory. See ARTHUR
W. CAMPBELL, THE LAW OF SENTENCING § 1:2, at 4-9 (2d ed. 1991). Reform was
prompted in 1764 by the publication of CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND
PUNISHMENTS 29 (Henry Paolucci trans., 1963) (1764) ("In orderfor punishment not to be,
in every instance, an act of violence of one or many against a private citizen, it must be
essentially public, prompt, necessary, the least possible in the given circumstances,
proportionateto the crimes, dictatedby the laws.").
30. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484. The stigma of a criminal conviction is society's
negative response to that conviction. For example, many employers will not hire persons
convicted of property crimes, and many people would rather not associate with bank
robbers. When the Court discussed stigma in Apprendi, it reasoned that a higher
maximum sentence for a particular crime increases the social stigma attached to that
crime. See id.
31. See id,
32. Id. at 494 n.19.
33. Id. at 481
34. See id. at 488-90. The Court previously allowed the use of prior convictions to
increase a sentence beyond the statutory maximum in Almendarez-Torrez v. United States,
523 U.S. 224, 244 (1998). Defendants need not receive procedural protections in a
subsequent trial so long as they were received in a previous one. Id The Court
acknowledged that the Apprendi reasoning should apply with equal force to recidivism,
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prohibits, without the procedural safeguards mentioned previously,
the use of facts, regardless of whether they are traditional elements of
an offense, to increase a defendant's sentence beyond the statutory
maximum. 3 The Court rejected New Jersey's argument that the hate
crime enhancement was based on motive rather than intent. 6 The
Court was concerned with the effect rather than the form of the
sentencing factor-whether the additional fact produced a greater
sentence than the verdict standing alone allowed.3 7 As discussed
below, North Carolina sentencing law is different in form from New
Jersey's, however, in some cases the effect is the same.
On October 1, 1994, in North Carolina, the Structured
Sentencing Act38 replaced the Fair Sentencing Act.39 While both acts
contained the same penological justifications, 40 their implementation

but the issue was neither raised in nor essential to the decision. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
The Court hinted that it might overrule Almendarez-Torrez in a proper case. See id. The
Court also questioned whether sentencing factors that increase the sentence beyond the
statutory maximum must be charged in an indictment, but did not decide the issue. See id.
at 477 n.3. In Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999), the Court noted in dicta that such
a factor in a federal prosecution "must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury,
and proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id at 243 n.6.
35. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477-78.
36. Generally, the prosecution does not have the burden of proving the defendant's
motive. Although conceivably relevant to whether the defendant committed the offense,
motive is distinguished from intent, which normally is an essential element of a crime.
Motive refers to why the defendant acted; intent refers to whether the defendant meant to
act. See Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observation on the Role of Motive in
the CriminalLaw PastandPresent, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635,688.
37. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 493-94 (recognizing that "'labels do not afford an
acceptable answer'" to whether a fact is considered motive or intent, rather the relevant
inquiry is whether "the required finding expose[s] the defendant to a greater punishment
than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict") (quoting State v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d
485,492 (NJ. 1999)).
38. Act of July 24, 1993, ch. 538, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 2298-2370 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1340.10 to 15A-1340.23 (1999)); see N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-1340.10 (1999). The act applies to crimes occurring on or after October 1,
1994. Id. Because North Carolina does not have a statute of limitations for felonies, see
State v. Johnson, 275 N.C. 264, 271, 167 S.E.2d 274, 279 (1969), the Fair Sentencing Act
could remain legally effective for decades to sentence defendants convicted of felonies
occurring between 1981 and October 1994.
39. Act of June 4, 1979, ch. 760,1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 850-71.
40. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.12 (1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.3 (Cum.
Supp. 1979). Both acts deal with proportional punishment, incapacitation, rehabilitation,
and general deterrence. Id. §§ 15A-1340.12, 15A-1340.3 (repealed by Act of July 24, 1993,
ch. 538, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 2318). The first purpose of the acts is generally considered a

retributive, or deontological, justification-punishment as an end in itself. See, e.g.,
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 99-107 (J. Ladd. Trans.,
1965) (1797); JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 88110 (1988). The other purposes are considered utilitarian, or teleological, justifications-
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differs markedly.4'
Under North Carolina's current structured
sentencing scheme, a judge must take several steps to determine the
appropriate punishment of a felony offender.4"
After a felony
conviction, the judge determines the offense class for the crime
according to statute. 43 Next, the judge determines the offender's prior
record level.' The offense class and prior record level constitute the
"presumptive" range according to the punishment chart.45 As
discussed below, however, the presumptive range is not the statutory
maximum penalty. 46 From the presumptive range, the judge must
take into account any aggravating47 or mitigating4 factors. The
punishment as a means to an end. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 1-5,178 (London, McMillan 1876).

41. For example, under the Fair Sentencing Act, a judge could sentence a defendant
convicted of a Class D felony with no prior criminal record to up to forty years in prison,
see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-1.1(a)(4) (repealed by Act of July 24, 1993, ch. 538, 1993 N.C.
Sess. Laws 2318), if any of several aggravating factors existed. See id § 15A-1340.4
(repealed by 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 538). Under the Structured Sentencing Act, the
maximum term a judge could impose on an identical defendant is 105 months (eight years
and nine months), see id § 15A-1340.17, but the defendant will actually serve more time
than under the Fair Sentencing Act because structured sentencing eliminates parole. Id
§ 15A-1340.13(d).
42. See generally STEVENS H. CLARKE, LAW OF SENTENCING PROBATION AND

PAROLE IN NORTH CAROLINA 41-119 (2d ed. 1997) (describing North Carolina's
sentencing procedure in considerable detail); NORTH CAROLINA SENTENCING AND
POLICY

ADVISORY

COMMISSION,

STRUCTURED

SENTENCING

TRAINING

AND

REFERENCE MANUAL 1-32 (1994) (describing the substance and application of the
structured sentencing laws for felonies).
43. The offense classification is set out in the relevant statute that either defines the
elements of the offense, see, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-39 (1999) (defining the elements of
first and second degree kidnapping and providing that these offenses are Class C and Class
E felonies respectively), or simply provides the offense classification for a common law
crime. See, e.g., id § 14-87.1 (providing that common law robbery is a Class G felony).
The felony offense classes are A through I (including BI and B2). See idt § 15A-1430.17
(c). Some common law felonies are omitted from the general statutes, see, e.g., State v.
Ingland, 278 N.C. 42, 50, 178 S.E.2d 577, 582 (1971) (holding that the common law with
respect to false imprisonment is the law of North Carolina even though no statute exists
making false imprisonment a crime).
44. See § 15A-1340.14. Prior record levels range from level I to level VI. Id The
prior record level is determined by assigning points to each prior conviction and tallying
up the score. Id For example, a defendant with a prior Class E conviction and a prior
class H conviction is assigned four points for the Class E conviction and two points for the
Class H conviction. Id The resulting total of six points gives the defendant a prior record
level of III. The State must prove prior offenses to the judge by a preponderance of the
evidence. Id
45. § 15A-1340.17(c).
46. See State v. Lucas, 353 N.C. 568,596,548 S.E.2d 712,731 (2001).
47. § 15A-1340.16(a). Examples of aggravating factors are: association with a "street
gang," id § 15A-1340.16(d)(2a); preventing arrest or aiding escape, id § 15A1340.16(d)(3); being hired to commit the crime, id § 15A-1340.16(d)(4); the heinous or
cruel nature of the offense, idt § 15A-1340.16(d)(7); causing risk of death to several
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prosecution must prove aggravating factors by a preponderance of
the evidence.49 One might pause at this point in light of Apprendi.
Both judge as fact finder and using the preponderance of evidence
standard violate the Apprendi rule.
With the felony classification, prior record level, and aggravating
and mitigating factors in hand, the judge must consult the punishment
chart to determine the minimum sentence. 0 The punishment chart is
divided into cells, which contain several components 1 To find the
correct cell, the judge traces the chart along the top to find the prior
record level, and then traces down to find the felony classification.
The corresponding cell also contains the possible ranges of
aggravated, presumptive, and mitigated sentences.52 If the judge finds
by a preponderance of the evidence that the aggravating factors
outweigh the mitigating factors, she may select a minimum sentence
from within the aggravated range;53 however, if the judge finds no
aggravating or mitigating factors, she must select a minimum sentence
from the presumptive range. 4

persons by a means of a weapon, id. § 15A-1340.16(d)(8); the age or infirmity of the
victim, id. § 15A-1340.16(d)(11); racial or ethnic animus, id. § 15A-1340.16(d)(17); the
defendant's non-support of his family, id. § 15A-1340.16(d)(18); and "[a]ny other
aggravating factor reasonably related to the purposes of sentencing." Id. § 15A1340.16(d)(20).
48. § 15A-1340.16(a). Examples of mitigating factors are: culpability reducing duress,
coercion, threat, or compulsion insufficient to constitute a defense, id § 15A1340.16(e)(1); the defendant's mental defect insufficient to constitute a defense, id § 15A1340.16(e)(3); restitution to the victim, id. § 15A-1340.16(e)(5); voluntary participation of
the victim, id. § 15A-1340.16(e)(6); defendant's cooperation with law enforcement or
prosecution of another felony, id § 15A-1340.16(e)(7); the defendant's reasonable belief
in the legality of his conduct, id. § 15A-1340.16(e)(10); the good character and reputation
of the defendant, id. § 15A-1340.16(e)(12); honorable discharge from the military, id
§ 15A-1340.16(e)(14); the defendant's acceptance of responsibility, id. § 15A1340.16(e)(15); support of his or her family, id. § 15A-1340.16(e)(17); positive employment
history, id § 15A-1340.16(e)(19); and "any other mitigating factor reasonably related to
the purposes of sentences." Id. § 15A-1340.16(e)(21).
The defendant must prove mitigating factors by a
49. § 15A-1340.16(a).
preponderance of the evidence. Id.
50. Id. § 15A-1340.17(c).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. § 15A-1640.16. During the years 1995 to 1997, approximately seven to ten
percent of all defendants received presumptive sentences in the aggravated range. See
RONALD F. WRIGHT, Flexibility in North Carolina Structured Sentencing, 1995-1997,
OVERCROWDED TIMEs, Dec. 1998, at 1,15.
54. § 15A-1340.17(c)(2). If mitigating factors exist and outweigh any aggravating
factors that may exist, the judge may choose a minimum sentence from the mitigated
range. Id. § 15A-1340.16(b).
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After selecting the minimum sentence from within the proper
range in the cell, the judge identifies the defendant's maximum
sentence.5 5 The minimum sentence fixes the maximum sentence; the
judge simply locates the maximum term that corresponds to the
57
56
minimum term in the relevant table. The "truth in sentencing
under this scheme is that once the judge decides the term, a
defendant must serve the entire minimum sentence, without
exception. 8

A hypothetical example clarifies the preceding description.
Suppose a defendant, with prior convictions for train robbery 9 and
larceny of a dog,' is convicted of malicious maiming, a class C
felony.61 The defendant's prior record level is 111.62 The judge then
finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
maliciously maimed the victim because of race, 63 and, because of the
absence of any mitigating factors, elects to sentence the defendant to
the aggravated minimum term. The judge selects a minimum term of
139 months from the aggravated range of 116 to 145 months. 64 The

55. Id. § 15A-1340.17(d)-(el).
56. See id.
57. "Truth in sentencing" is a penal reform movement closely tied to determinate
sentencing, if not the same thing. See PAULA M. DITrON & DORIS JAMES WILSON, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS 1 (1999), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/tssp.pdf. The main premise is that offenders actually
serve their term of imprisonment rather than having their sentences reduced by parole and
other factors. Id. Such sentencing laws have been prompted by federal funding of
correctional facilities for states that require violent offenders to serve at least eighty-five
percent of their sentence. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 13703, 13704,
13706 (Supp. V 1999)). A majority of states have enacted these sentencing laws in recent
years. See DITON & WILSON, supra, at 3. Truth in sentencing was also an integral part of
the 1992 governor's race in North Carolina. CLARKE, supra note 42, at 48. Preliminary
statistics show that structured sentencing accomplishes truth in sentencing. See DITrON &
WILSON, supra, at 9 (noting that the percentage of the sentence that offenders actually
served increased from twenty-four percent in 1993 to forty percent in 1997, which includes
a substantial number of offenders released under the Fair Sentencing Act).
58. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.13(d). A prisoner may reduce the maximum term of
incarceration by "earned time credits" while in prison. Id
59. See id § 14-88. This offense is a Class D felony. Id
60. See id § 14-81(al). This offense is a Class I felony. Id
61. See idt § 14-30.
62. A Class D felony is assigned six points, id § 15A-1340.14(b)(2), and a Class I
felony is assigned two points. Id § 15A-1340.14(b)(4). The resulting total, eight points,
gives the offender a prior record level of Ill. Id. § 15A-1340.14(c)(3).
63. See id § 15A-1340.16(d)(17).
64. Id § 15A-1340.17(c).
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maximum term corresponding to 139 months is 176 months.65 Thus,
66
the defendant's sentence is 139 to 176 months of active punishment.
Structured sentencing includes additional provisions that require
a judge to increase the defendant's sentence. One such provision is
the sentence enhancement for using or displaying a firearm while
committing a felony. 67 Under the terms of this statute, if the judge
finds that the defendant used or displayed a firearm during the
offense, he must increase the defendant's minimum sentence by sixty
months unless display or use of a firearm is an element of the
offense. The North Carolina Supreme Court, however, modified the
procedures under this statute in State v. Lucas.69 Due to Apprendi,
the court held that, in all circumstances, the State must charge the use
of a firearm in the bill of the indictment, and the trial judge must
70
submit this fact to the jury subject to a reasonable doubt standard.
The jury found the defendant in Lucas guilty of first-degree
burglary, a class D felony, and second-degree kidnapping, a class E
felony.71 The trial court found a prior record level of I and no
aggravating factors, and thereafter imposed a sentence at the high
end of the presumptive range for each offense: sixty-four to eightysix months for the burglary conviction and twenty-five to thirty-nine
months for the kidnapping charge. 73 Subsequently, the trial court
added sixty months to each of the defendant's sentences after finding
that he displayed a firearm during the commission of the offenses. 74
After this addition, the court imposed sentences of 124 to 146 months

65. Id § 15A-1340.17(e).
66. "Active punishment" means imprisonment in a state correctional facility. Id.
§ 15A-1340.11(1).
67. Id. § 15A-1340.16A; see also id. § 15A-1340.16B (enhancing sentence to life
imprisonment for a class B1 felony committed against a victim under fourteen years old);
id. § 15A-1430.16C (enhancing felony class one level if felony is committed while wearing
a bullet proof vest).
68. Id. § 15A-1340.16A(b)(2).
69. 353 N.C. 568,548 S.E.2d 712 (2001).
70. Id. at 597-98,548 S.E.2d at 731.
71. Id. at 593, 548 S.E.2d at 729; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-52 (1999); id. § 14-39(b).
The defendant was also found guilty of possession of a weapon of mass death and
destruction, a sawed-off shotgun. Lucas, 353 N.C. at 571-72, 548 S.E.2d at 716. This
offense is a class F felony. § 14-288.8(d).
72. Lucas, 353 N.C. at 593,548 S.E.2d at 729.
73. Id. The defendant received a sentence of sixteen to twenty months for possession
of a weapon of mass death and destruction. Id. at 571, 548 S.E.2d at 715. All three
sentences ran consecutively. IM
74. Id at 593, 548 S.E.2d at 729.
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and eighty-five to ninety-nine months, respectively, for the burglary
and kidnapping convictions. 75
The defendant argued that the imposition of the sixty month
enhancement was unconstitutional both facially and as applied by the
trial court.76 To evaluate this argument, the court, after discussing
Jones v. United States77 and Apprendi, had to determine " 'the

prescribed statutory maximum' " penalty.78 This task proved difficult
because the North Carolina General Statutes do not explicitly
prescribe a statutory maximum sentence for most common law and
statutory crimes.79 As mentioned above,80 ascertaining the maximum

sentence for an individual offender requires several steps on the
sentencing chart.8'

The court determined, however, that the

prescribed statutory maximum sentence for a particular felony class is
the maximum sentence in section 15A-1340.17(e), which corresponds
to the highest minimum aggravated sentence for the highest prior
record level of VI in section 15A-1340.17(c).' From this premise, the
court ultimately held that any time the State seeks to enhance the
sentence under section 15A-1340.16A, it must allege the use of a
firearm in an indictment, and the fact of firearm use must be
submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.83
75. IL The supreme court noted that the trial court incorrectly calculated the
sentence under section 15A-1340.16A. Lucas, 353 N.C. at 598-99, 548 S.E.2d at 732.
Rather than adding the sixty month enhancement to both the minimum and maximum
terms, the trial court should have added the sixty month enhancement only to the
minimum term, then applied the corresponding maximum term to the enhanced minimum.
Id. This approach would yield correct sentences of 124 to 158 and 85 to 111 months for
the respective convictions. Id.; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.17(e). The defendant could
not receive an enhancement for possession of a weapon of mass death and destruction
because the use of a firearm is an element of that offense. See id. § 14-288.8; §15A1340.16A.
76. Lucas, 353 N.C. at 592,548 S.E.2d at 728.
77. 526 U.S. 227, 252 (1999) (construing 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994) (authorizing an
enhanced penalty if the court finds the offense resulted in death or serious bodily injury)
"as establishing three separate offenses by the specification of distinct elements" that
"must be charged by indictment, proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and submitted to a
jury for its verdict").
78. Lucas, 353 N.C. at 595, 548 S.E.2d at 730 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466,490 (2000)).
79. See id.; infra notes 84-95 and accompanying text. One exception is North
Carolina General Statute section 14-17 which prescribes a maximum punishment of death
for first-degree murder.
80. See supra notes 42-58 and accompanying text.
81. Lucas, 353 N.C. at 595-96, 548 S.E.2d at 730; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.17(c)
(1999).
82. Lucas, 353 N.C. at 596-97, 548 S.E.2d at 731. The court declared this holding by
ipse dixit. See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
83. Lucas, 353 N.C. at 597-98,548 S.E.2d at 731.
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Although Lucas is significant for its procedural modification of
the firearm enhancement, several other aspects of the court's holding
warrant discussion. First, the court failed to explain fully the
rationale of the maximum sentence. 84 The court noted that, at
arraignment and after a sentence bargain, most trial judges inform
defendants of the maximum sentence using the theoretical maximum
sentence possible for the offense class. 5 After discussing this
procedure, the court merely stated that it believed this approach was
proper for determining the maximum sentence.86 Whether the court
based its holding on legislative intent or on an interpretation of
Apprendi is not clear, but it was not the only possible holding.87 The
Court could have taken several approaches, as illustrated in State v.
Guice.rs
In Guice, the defendant argued that the maximum punishment
should be determined with reference to the defendant's actual prior
record level and the trial court's aggravating and mitigating factor
determination. 89 For the defendant in Guice this meant the maximum
sentence was forty-four months for a Class E felony.90 This method
has serious flaws because it essentially eliminates the "prescribed"
maximum punishment for any crime. The maximum sentence could
only be determined after the trial and sentence of a particular
defendant. Such a lack of an ascertainable maximum punishment not
only would pose difficulty in construing structured sentencing with
regard to Apprendi,91 but also would undermine the Act's general
goal of deterrence.9

84. Id. at 596, 548 S.E.2d at 730-31.
85. Id. at 596, 548 S.E.2d at 730.
86. Id. at 596, 548 S.E.2d at 730-31.

87. See infra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
88. 141 N.C. App. 177,541 S.E.2d 474 (2000).
89. ML at 193, 541 S.E.2d at 484.
90. Id. Because he was sentenced to the presumptive range and had only a level II
prior conviction level, the highest possible minimum sentence was twenty-nine months.
See id.; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.17(c) (1999). The corresponding maximum sentence
was forty-four months. See id. § 15A-1340.17(e).
91. In United States v. Jones, 195 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 1999), the Fourth Circuit rejected
a similar formulation because it would essentially exempt all defendants sentenced under
Structured Sentencing from 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) which declares it unlawful for a person
"who has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year," inter alia, to possess a firearm in interstate commerce. The court rejected the
formulation because under it maximum sentences would not exist in North Carolina,
something the court could not believe Congress intended. Jones, 195 F.3d at 207.
Conversely, this formulation would seem to exempt the state from any Apprendi claim.

Because the maximum punishment could not be determined until the sentence was
imposed, no fact, established by any standard of proof, would ever increase the maximum
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In Guice, the State offered a formulation identical to that which
the Lucas court adopted-the highest theoretical sentence.93 Using
this calculation, Apprendi permits a judge to find aggravating factors
by a preponderance of the evidence. A sentence in the aggravated
range would never exceed the "prescribed maximum sentence." 94
The judge would merely be exercising discretion in sentencing a
defendant "within the range prescribed by statute," which Apprendi

expressly permits. 95
Under the court's holding in Lucas, however, aggravating factors
will survive any attack within the North Carolina courts. Given that
the maximum sentence for an offense rests at the high end of the
aggravated range, any sentence within the sentencing chart logically
cannot exceed the "prescribed statutory maximum." 96 Nonetheless,
given the court's omission of a legislative intent foundation in Lucas,
aggravating factors might be open to collateral attack in federal
habeas corpus proceedings 97 or on direct review to the United States
Supreme Court. A federal court may view the Lucas opinion as
resting primarily on an interpretation of Apprendi, rather than on

state law.98
One solution to this problem is a law amending the North
Carolina General Statutes by adding a description of each class of
felony and prescribing the maximum punishment. For example: A
Class C felony shall be punishable by imprisonmentfor 261 months.
The description of each felony class should be in the same manner,
sentence. The Supreme Court most likely did not intend this result in Apprendi. See
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,484 (2000).
92. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.12. The dual goals of general deterrence are to
prevent people from committing any crime and also to persuade them to chose a less
serious crime over a more serious crime. See BENTHAM, supra note 40, at 178, 181.
Under a purely individualized formulation, a person convicted of second-degree rape,
section 14-27.3, might have a higher "maximum" punishment than a person convicted of
first-degree rape. § 14-27.2; see id § 15A-1340.17(c). This phenomenon could send the
message to potential rapists that there is little difference in the consequences of
committing a more serious offense.
93. Guice, 141 N.C. App. at 193-94,541 S.E.2d at 485.
94. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
95. Id at 481. The same result would be reached if the court takes the defendant's
prior record level into account because the highest aggravated sentence would essentially
be the maximum.
96. Id at 490.
97. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 2001). Whether Apprendi applies retroactively in
§ 2254 proceedings is beyond the scope of this Recent Development.
98. The federal court would have to determine whether the state defendant's claim
"resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States." Id. § 2254(d)(1).
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deriving the maximum sentence from the current punishment chart
and corresponding maximum sentence. Such a statute would shield

aggravating factors from any Apprendi claims.
This solution is by no means a novel concept. An overwhelming

majority of jurisdictions specifically define a maximum punishment
for criminal offenses. These jurisdictions either set out the maximum
alongside the definition of the substantive offense,99 or group all

offenses into particular classes and set out the maximum punishment
1 North Carolina, in fact, fell into the latter category
for the class."0
under the Fair Sentencing Act.10 1
Although its holding with respect to the maximum sentence is
understandable, another part of the holding in Lucas is rather
confusing and warrants discussion.
According to the court's
calculation, the maximum punishment for a class D felony is 229
months.10 The defendant's actual sentence for the burglary count,

99. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) (2000); CAL. PENAL CODE § 213 (West 1999); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 22-406 (2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-2 (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 706-660 (Michie 1993); IDAHO CODE § 18-5002 (Michie 1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:60 (West 1997); MD. ANN CODE art. 27, § 29 (1996); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265,
§ 24 (West Supp. 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.110 (2001); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.221 (West Supp. 2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-17-37 (1999); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 45-5-213 (1999); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. 200.460 (Michie 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 381 (West Supp. 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-4-3 (2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 608
(1974); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3-11 (Michie 1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-502 (Michie
1999).
100. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-6 (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125 (Michie 2000);
ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-702 (Supp. 2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-401 (Michie 1997);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-105 (West 2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-35a (1994);
DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4205 (1995 & Supp. 2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.082 (West
Supp. 2001); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-8-1 (1993 & Supp. 2000); IND. CODE § 35-50-2-4
(2000); IOWA CODE ANN. § 902.9 (West Supp. 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4501 (1993);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.060 (Michie 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 1252
(West Supp. 2000); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 557.021 (West 1999); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28105 (Michie Supp. 2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:2 (Supp. 2000); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:43-6 (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-18-15 to 15.1 (Michie 1996); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 70.00 (McKinney 1998); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-01 (1997); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 161.605 (1997); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1103 (1998); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-20 (Law. Coop. Supp. 2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-6-1 (Michie 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35111 (1997); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.32-12.34 (Vernon 1997); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-3-203 (1999 & Supp. 2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-10 (Michie Supp. 2000); WASH
REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.20.021 (West 1999); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.50 (West 1996 & Supp.
2000); cf MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.06 (1980) (defining maximum punishments for each
class of offense).
101. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-1.1 (Supp. 1980) (effective March 1, 1981) (repealed by
Act of July 24, 1993, ch. 538, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 2313). The language of the proposed
maximum punishment is nearly identical to this section. See id.
102. State v. Lucas, 353 N.C. 568,596-97,548 S.E.2d 712,731 (2001).
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including the firearm enhancement, was 124 to 146 months,103 but
should have been 124 to 158 months 3 " Thus, one could conclude that
the defendant's penalty was not increased "beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum."' 5 The court, however, considered the effect of
the firearm enhancement as though the defendant had received the6
highest theoretically possible maximum sentence of 229 months.'0
The firearm enhancement would then theoretically result in a
maximum sentence of 301 months, which exceeds the statutory
maximum of 229 months.'0 Therefore, the court held, because the
fact that the defendant used a firearm during the commission of the
offense was neither alleged in the bill of indictment, nor submitted to
the jury, the sixty month enhanced sentence was imposed
10 8
improperly.
This portion of the court's holding departs from a substantial
amount of analogous case law. For example, every federal court of
appeals with criminal jurisdiction holds that Apprendi does not apply
to upward departures or adjustments under the United States
Sentencing Guidelines when the resulting actual sentence does not
exceed the statutory maximum.1°9 Many state courts have reached the
same conclusion under their own sentencing provisions." 0 The North

103. Id. at 593, 548 S.E.2d at 729.
104. Id. at 598-99, 548 S.E.2d at 732. The trial court added sixty months to the
minimum and the maximum sentences separately. The supreme court stated that this
calculation was incorrect. The court should have added sixty months to the minimum and
then found the maximum that corresponded to that enhanced minimum sentence. Id.
105. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S 466,490 (2000).
106. Lucas, 353 N.C. at 596-97,548 S.E.2d at 731.
107. Id. 301 months is the maximum corresponding to the enhanced minimum of 243
months. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.17(e)(1999).
108. Lucas, 353 N.C. at 598,548 S.E.2d at 732.
109. See, e.g., United States v. Fields, 251 F.3d 1041, 1043-44 (D.C. Cir. 2001); United
States v. Robinson, 241 F.3d 115,121 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v. Garcia, 240 F.3d 180,
183 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Angle, 254 F.3d 514,518 (4th Cir. 2001); United States
v. Heckard, 238 F.3d 1222, 1235-36 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Williams, 235 F.3d
858, 863-64 (3d Cir. 2000); United States v. Doggett, 230 F.3d 160, 164-65 (5th Cir. 2000);
United States v. Corrado, 227 F.3d 528, 542 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Nance, 236
F.3d 820, 825 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Aguayo-Delgado, 220 F.3d 926, 933 (8th Cir.
2000); United States v. Hernandez-Guardado, 228 F.3d 1017, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 2000);
United States v. Nealy, 232 F.3d 825, 829 n.3 (11th Cir. 2000). Upward departures from
the sentence range established under the U.S. sentencing guidelines occur where a court
finds an aggravating circumstance that is not listed under the guidelines. See U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual §§ 5K2.0-5K2.21 (2001). Adjustments refer to increases in
the base offense level upon a finding of particular circumstances. See id.§§ 3A1.1-3E1.1.
110. See, e.g., Pearson v. State, 794 So. 2d 448, 449 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001); People v.
Cleveland, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 641, 646 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); Caraballo v. State, 26 Fla. L.
Weekly D2317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (per curiam); People v. Ford, No. 90083, 2001
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Carolina Supreme Court easily could have held that the defendant's

actual sentence on the burglary count was proper, because it did not
exceed 229 months.

But, the court chose not to take this path.

Therefore, the section 15A-1340.16A sentencing enhancement must
in all circumstances be alleged in an indictment and submitted to the

jury for proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The enhancement factor allegation requirement111 is another
interesting aspect of Lucas. Apprendi does not require states to

allege sentencing factors that increase the sentence beyond the
statutory maximum in an indictment. 1 2 Indeed, the Supreme Court

has never held that the grand jury clause of the Fifth Amendment

3

applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment." 4 The
Lucas court apparently relied in part on Jones v. United States"5 to
include the indictment requirement." 6 In Jones, the Court, due in

part to constitutional concerns, construed an ambiguous federal
statute as setting out three separate offenses, requiring allegations in
an indictment and submission to a jury, rather than as a single offense
with two sentencing enhancements." 7

Although the Jones holding does not bind the states, Lucas
appears to have resolved sub silentio any state law sentencing issues
with respect to indictments."' The North Carolina State Constitution
requires an indictment to initiate all felony prosecutions, unless
waived with counsel." 9 At a minimum, every indictment must allege
facts supporting each element of a criminal offense. 20 Because
Apprendi treats sentencing factors that increase the penalty beyond
the statutory maximum as though they are elements of an underlying
WL 1243651, at *3 (Ill. Oct. 18, 2001); State v. McCoy, 631 N.W.2d 446, 451 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2001); State v. Gore, 21 P.3d 262,276-77 (Wash. 2001).
111. Lucas, 353 N.C. at 597-98,548 S.E.2d at 731.
112. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,477 n.3 (2000).
113. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury....").
Elements of a federal offense must be charged in an indictment. Jones v. United States,
526 U.S. 227,232 (1999).
114. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 n.3; see Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884)
(holding that the Grand Jury Clause does not apply to the states).
115. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
116. See Lucas, 353 N.C. at 593-94, 548 S.E.2d 729 (discussing Jones).
117. Jones, 526 U.S. at 229.
118. Lucas, 353 N.C. at 597-98,548 S.E.2d at 731.
119. N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 22 ("Except in misdemeanor cases initiated in the District
Court Division, no person shall be put to answer any criminal charge but by indictment,
presentment, or impeachment."). A presentment, an independent accusation by the grand
jury, cannot initiate a charge. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-641(c) (1999).
120. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-924(a)(5).
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offense,121 the sentencing enhancement factor in section 15A1340.16A must be charged in the indictment.
The indictment requirement has serious consequences. The
formality of an indictment is considered jurisdictional. 122 A court has
no power to render a valid judgment without a proper indictment.123
State v. McNair"4 illustrates the significance of this requirement. The
defendant's sentence in McNairwas enhanced under the same statute
at issue in Lucas.'2 However, the defendant failed to object to the
26
fact that the enhancement factor was not submitted to the jury.
Due to this failure, the defendant's assignment of error became
subject to "plain error" analysis. 127 The state court of appeals held
that the jury would have determined that the defendant possessed a
firearm and overruled his assignment of error."8 Nevertheless, the
court arrested the judgment on its own motion because the
enhancement factor was not alleged in the indictment and therefore
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose the sixty month
enhancement.1 29
Considering Lucas's indictment requirement and Apprendi's
burden of proof and fact finder requirements, North Carolina's other
two sentencing enhancement provisions should be examined. First,
section 15A-1340.16B requires a life sentence without parole if a
defendant with a prior class B1 felony conviction commits another
Class B1 felony against a victim thirteen years old or younger.1 30
Calculated according to the court's holding in Lucas, the maximum
punishment for a Class BI felony is life imprisonment without
parole. 32 This statute is valid regardless of the standard of proof on
the victim's age or the identity of the fact finder because the
enhanced term will not go beyond the statutory maximum.
Second, section 15A-1340.16C, which increases the defendant's
felony class if the defendant possessed a bullet proof vest during the
121. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,494 n.19 (2000).
122. See McClure v. State, 267 N.C. 212, 215, 148 S.E.2d 15, 17-18 (1966); State v.
Neville, 108 N.C. App. 330,332,423 S.E.2d 496,497 (1992).
123. McClure, 267 N.C. at 215, 148 S.E.2d at 17-18; Neville, 108 N.C. App. at 332, 423
S.E.2d at 497.
124. 554 S.E.2d 665 (N.C. App. 2001).
125. Id at 670; State v. Lucas, 353 N.C. 568,597-98,548 S.E.2d 712,731 (2001).
126. McNair, 554 S.E.2d at 670.
127. Id.

128. Id. at 671-72.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 672-73.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16B (1999).
353 N.C. 568, 596, 548 S.E.2d 712, 731 (2001).
§ 15A-1340.17(c).
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felony, should also be examined.'3 3 Sentences under this statute will
pass constitutional muster if, and only if, the fact of possession of the
bullet proof vest is charged in an indictment, submitted to the jury,
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. This statute necessarily
increases a defendant's penalty beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum. For example, if a person robs a convenience store with a
revolver, he commits a Class D felony. The maximum penalty for
that class felony is 229 months."M If the robber wore a bullet proof
vest during the robbery, he may be sentenced in the Class C felony
range, with a possible sentence of up to 261 months. Thus, the
penalty is increased beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, so the
procedural safeguards of Apprendi and Lucas must attach.
The indictment requirement likely will lead to more sentence
vacations than the jury requirement in the near future. The new rule
of Lucas applies retroactively only to cases on direct review or cases
that are not final as of August 9, 2001,111 but a significant number of
defendants who were not indicted properly may fall into this
category. Given that the indictment issue is jurisdictional, failure to
charge an enhancement factor may lead to many automatic reversals.
The other aspects of the Lucas holding appear less consequential.
The maximum sentence formulation likely saves aggravated
sentences from Apprendi attacks, and compliance with the
requirement that all firearm enhancements be pled in an indictment
and submitted to a jury is easy. This clarity notwithstanding, the
General Assembly should codify the changes Lucas makes, at least
regarding the maximum sentence. For the time being, however, the
wisest course of action is for North Carolina prosecutors to plead all
the facts under all three sentencing enhancement statutes in an
indictment and submit those facts to a jury to determine if the state
has proved them beyond a reasonable doubt.
MICHAEL PATRICK BURKE

133. Id § 15A-1340.16C.
134. I& § 15A-1340.17(c), (e).
135. State v. McNair, 554 S.E.2d 665,670 (N.C. App. 2001).

